Water Archives · John Watts interview

Title

eng John Watts interview

Description

eng Legislative director to Senator Feinstein and principal broker of the San Joaquin River Settlement.

Creator

eng Watts, John

eng Holyoke, Thomas

Relation

eng Water Archive Oral Histories

Coverage

eng California State University, Fresno

Date

eng 10/1/2012

Format

eng Microsoft Word 2003 document, 7 pages

Identifier

eng SCMS_waoh_00015

extracted text

>> Thomas Holyoke: Here interviewing Mr. John Watts, currently Legislative
Director and Senator Feinstein about the San -- the negotiations for the San
Joaquin River settlement. And let's just start off this way. Why would the
office of the U.S. Senator be called on to get into this issue in the first
place?
>> John Watts: That's a good question to start with. The settlement negotiations
would require federal law to implement the settlement and so if a lawsuit
passed, the senator needs to -- or a senator I remember Congress needs to be
involved to sponsor that law is the short answer. That's the technical answer.
The other answer is that I think Senator Feinstein has for a long time played a
major role in California water issues. She's someone who both farmers, cities
and environmentalists feel like they can turn to and will try to you know -- try
to fairly represent their interests in negotiations. And so there have been long
running litigation over the San Joaquin River and whether some substantial
portion of the river flow would need to be used to restore salmon fishery in the
river. And the -- and by 2005, both -- all the principle parties of that
legislation - the United States, Friant Water District and The Environmental
Coalition - all believed that it might be useful to have a settlement of that
litigation rather than having the courts fully and finally try to resolve the
litigation. And so they turned -- actually it was not just under Feinstein but
also other members of Congress including Congressman Radanovich who initially in
2005 approached Senator Feinstein after Friant approached him saying, "Would you
be interested in working on this and to -- trying to come up with a legislative
solution to resolve the litigation?
>> Thomas Holyoke: Had you or the office kept close track of this issue before
you were approached about working on the settlement?
>> John Watts: Yes. We had -- because there was concern from both the side of
the farmers and the environmentalists, the Friant Water District, 17 thousand
small to midsize family farms in the San Joaquin Valley was concerned because
they'd been losing in the litigation. They were concerned about what this might
mean for them. And would they kept us abreast of their concerns on the issue.
And the environmentalists were very interested in trying to get the salmon fish
restored in the river and so they had also kept us abreast. But no one had
really asked us to do anything for awhile before 2005 when Congressman
Radanovich approached Senator Feinstein after Friant had diverged him and asked
her to work with him on possible legislative resolution of the issue that would
have restored the salmon fishery but do so in a way that would preserve a
reliable water supply and minimize the water losses for Friant.
>> Thomas Holyoke: So now what year is it when you start having negotiations out
here in Washington, just point and time here?
>> John Watts: Well it was in the summer of 2005 as I recall when Congressman
Radanovich -- or it may have actually been -- it was 2005 or 2004 actually. It
was one of those two years. I need to go check. Congressman Radanovich
approached Senator Feinstein and then that set off a lengthy negotiation among
the parties after we had an initial proposal and the party said, "No we'd like
to take it." The parties being the United States, Friant and then The
Environmental Coalition. They had a long, lengthy negotiation where they said,
"Rather than having you propose something to us" which we did "we'd rather see
if we can come up with something amongst ourselves. We said, "That's fine." They
worked out an agreement by late 2000 and -- I think it was -- as I think about
it -- it was 2005 when Congressman Radanovich approached Senator Feinstein. They
worked out an agreement amongst themselves by late 2006. And then -- but then

there was a need for other parties had concerns about that and then we got
involved in trying to come up with implementing legislation that both would
allow the settlement to be implemented and also would address some of the third
party's -- the other party's concerns.
>> Thomas Holyoke: Who were the parties?
>> John Watts: The parties to the litigation?
>> Thomas Holyoke: Well more directly the parties around the table here.
>> John Watts: So the parties around the table were the parties of litigation
which is the Interior Department and the Bureau of Reclamation of the Interior
Department and then at some point I think there was some Justice Department
attorneys who were brought in as well. But it was the Interior Department,
Friant Water District and then The Environmental Coalition which was led by Hal
Candee of the Natural Resource Defense Council or NRDC. And then the parties who
came around the table however though and to me with us actually also included on
the federal government side the National Marine Fishery Service, Jim Lecky of
the National Marine Fishery Service represented their concerns because they are
responsible for the salmon fishery under the [inaudible] Act. And then -- but
then the other parties - some of the third parties - who were concerned about
the settlement which included the exchange contractors, Modesto and Turlock
Irrigation District, the Tributary Water Districts, they were concerned about
the settlement's effect on them. And then Kern Water District was also involved.
They were also concerned. So other California water districts that were also
involved. And then we had members of Congress as well. So it was Congressman
Radanovich, Congressman Nunes, Congressman Costa, Congressman Cardoza,
Congressman Hambo [phonetic], members of Congress from the San Joaquin Valley.
And then at some point Senator Boxer as well.
>> Thomas Holyoke: The way I've often heard this described was a lot of long
negotiating sessions here in the office: possibly in this very room.
>> John Watts: Yes. There were long negotiation sessions in this very -- in fact
in this very room. Yes. So I -- one key difference was I was not sitting in this
chair. Senator Feinstein was sitting in this chair but I was carefully watching
from one of the back benches and providing input to her and answering questions
[inaudible] the parties as they came up. But there were a number of long
negotiation sessions in the fall of 2006, in September or October: that time
frame.
>> Thomas Holyoke: And can we get a better sense here as to you know what issues
were being hashed out in this room?
>> John Watts: There were a few key issues which mainly had to do with the third
party's concerns and then also concerns about the cost of the settlement and how
it would be funded. So one set of concerns had to do with if the salmon were
reintroduced - if the Central Valley Chinook salmon were reintroduced into the
river pursuant to the settlement - would other parties such as the Tributary
Water District from Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts, would they be
liable for taking the species if they happen to turn and run up the Modesto
River, the [inaudible] River, those sorts of things. And [inaudible] River.
Those concerns ultimately were resolved by establishing an experimental
population designation of the Endangered Species Act so that the National Marine
Fishery Service could write a rule and it was directing them to write a rule
that would establish protection for the third parties from take of those fish

through 2025. That was the first thing. And then a related issue was Federal
Power Act would [inaudible] impose restrictions on the re-licensing of the hydro
power dams on those rivers due to the salmon. And the same, they would defer who
was directed to refrain from imposing extra conditions through 2025. So they
were protected in that manner. A second set of concerns was other water
districts in San Joaquin Valley [inaudible], would they suffer contract water
supply losses due to settlement? And they and the parties worked out a provision
which said that if [inaudible] provided directly in the settlement, there would
be no involuntary water supply reductions caused by the settlement for these
other parties. So that's a second provision. There also was discussion about
something called Reach 4B which is a lower portion of the San Joaquin River. And
the exchange contractors who include a lot of land owners along Reach 4B, they
were concerned -- there was a question, "Would we use the old river channel
which hadn't been used for a long time or would we use a flood bypass for that
reach of the river for running restoration flows?" And the exchange contractors
were concerned about using for the full flood flows in the spring the old river
channel because they thought it would flood a lot of their lands. They thought
that it might require condemnation and in the number of their lands. However the
environmentalists were interested in trying to restore that portion of the
river. There was agreement worked out that the agencies would further study that
if it was -- and then we were also concerned it would cost a lot of money that
we didn't have. There was an agreement worked out the agency would further that
before they would consider using the original river channel for that stretch.
Those were 3 of the major issues. There also were discussions about federal
funding, state funding, those sorts of things.
>> Thomas Holyoke: The number of meetings just sort of ballpark: talking 10,
hundred?
>> John Watts: There were not a hundred. It probably seemed like it. It probably
seemed like there was a whole series of meetings. I think there were more like
10 but they were serious that what would happen is the senator would make this a
priority for the day. So she'd have all the parties come in. She'd meet with
them for a few hours in the morning and then she'd send them off to negotiation
here, negotiate -- and then bring them back either later that day or the next
day. And we had a few sessions like that. So...
>> Thomas Holyoke: And what were tempers like at this kind of a meeting -- these
meetings?
>> John Watts: There were not really temperamental outbursts. I mean there was
some tense negotiations. I was thinking back on it. I think that virtually
everyone there wanted to work something out. There really -- there weren't
people trying to sabotage the negotiations really. People wanted to work
something out so that certainly the settling parties who had already reached a
settlement, they wanted to work something out. And so they were willing to try
to reach agreement. And I think because Friant really did want all [inaudible]
districts ratify this, Friant really wanted to reach a settlement and have a
settlement go through. I think other joining water districts you know wanted to
work with Friant to try to get their concerns met without blowing up the
settlement. So that I think there were tense negotiations but there were not -there were no -- I can't remember any temper tantrums anyway.
>> Thomas Holyoke: So if everyone coming to this was already -- had some
investment in the idea of a settlement, why was it a [inaudible]? Why was
everyone willing to put aside litigation which had been going on for years? Why
was everyone willing to put aside litigation and reach some kind of deal?

>> John Watts: Well I think it was these and parties had different reasons. I
think Friant had been losing in court. The district judge had ruled against them
on several issues and then significantly the 9th Circuit had affirmed on a
couple of key issues, namely that the state fish and game [inaudible] provision
requiring when a dam was constructed, that the fisheries below the dam and the
river be maintained in good condition, that that provision applied to San
Joaquin River and would require the release of water from Friant Dam sufficient
to restore our population, maintain -- in this case, restore what was considered
[inaudible] loss, the population of the Chinook salmon in the river. And also
[inaudible] Project Improvement Act which [inaudible] passed in 1992 did not
preempt space anyway that provision. So Friant had been losing on the merits and
they were -- and they expected even though they were going to keep litigating
it, that they would ultimately lose on the merits. And then they were then
concerned about what the judge would order as a remedy? That he might order a
huge amount of water being released with no effort to mitigate their water
supply loses. So they concluded that they might do better with a settlement if - where Congress would come in, establish a limited amount of water that they
would lose you know based on a hydro craft and negotiate with the plaintiffs
which was around 165, 180 thousand [inaudible] per year on average. And it was
part of a settlement and legislation a provision to mitigate their water supply
losses. And it was called The Water Management Goal. And there were a number of
provisions in the settlement and then ultimately in the legislation, those were
expanded upon to provide funding from the settlement funds to widen the FriantKern Canal, put pump packs on the Friant-Kern Canal to help them to convey
water. And then also to help fund groundwater storage facilities. A provision
calling for recirculation of water from the Delta. All these things to mitigate
our water losses. So that was Friant's interest. I think the environmentalists
recognize that even though there were doing really well in court, that having
this actually work was going to be difficult to do. They could get a judge to
order a release of water but what would happen then was somewhat uncertain. You
know, the judge could not necessarily -- could not order Congress to appropriate
money to restore levees for example. A lot of water might be ordered released
but it would -- but it might not restore the fishery without actually taking
actual steps that might involve Congress like providing funding to restore
levees, that short of thing. So the environmentalists I think recognized that it
was in their interest to try to work out an agreement and it also might be more
durable. I mean it cemented their win if they got an agreement that they could
restore the fishery. So the environmentalists I think got that incentive. And
then I think the federal officials had those incentives plus I think they felt
that having this resolve would remove a substantial uncertainty over water
management in California which already has way more than enough uncertainties.
And this would help provide certainty which is important for everyone in terms
of water management until we can focus on some of the other uncertainties like
what do we do with the [inaudible], and things like that. So those are some of
the party's incentives.
>> Thomas Holyoke: The negotiations went along, was there - if you may remember
any sort of particular issue that got solved that's sort of allowed everything
else to get resolved? Get all the rest of the ducks in the row as it were?
>> John Watts: I think the hardest issue was, "What do we do with the Endangered
Species Act and this protection for the Tributary Water Districts and others
from take?" That was the one that I think was -- that was really the last
significant issue that was resolved in these discussions in the fall of 2006. So
as I think about it, it really wasn't that we resolved one issue and then that
resolved and that allowed the rest to resolve. I think that as I said I think

the people came in good faiths and negotiations. And the principle sounding
parties at this point they reached a settlement. They negotiated [inaudible].
They were somewhat reluctant to reopen it for the sake of third parties, but
Senator Feinstein said, "We have to do this. You know, that we can't provide -we have to find a way to provide protection to the third parties. And so they
were willing to negotiate. You know they realized we had to do this. So I think
we tackled the issues. We didn't tackle the hardest issue first and we tackled
the hardest issue last but we worked through the issues in a constructive way.
And that got us there.
>> Thomas Holyoke: So the point that negotiations wrap up, well first what -you remember about what point and time we are or when negotiations have come to
an end/?
>> John Watts: Well I guess I should say that if negotiations came to an end as
I recall in October - it was September and October - of 2006. I should say to be
clear there were further negotiations later. A bill got introduced then. It did
not pass in that [inaudible] that Congress: fall of 2006. And then in 2007, the
same bill was reintroduced but there were some changes made to that bill and of
course in the next Congress with a bill that actually didn't even pass in that
Congress either. But there were some changes made, mainly from the standpoint of
allowing Friant to prepay its water contracts wi6th reclamation and to get
indefinite water right for prepaying. The water contracts also get more greater
funding stream for funding settlement. That was one key provision. There was
also provision put in which provided definite funding streams for Friant to
build some of these projects for mitigating its water supply losses that I
mentioned [inaudible] Friant-Kern now. The pump acts and some of the ground
water banks. Those were put in. So negotiation continued but the negotiation of
the fall of 2006 and then ultimately the legislation was passed as part of an
[inaudible] natural resources bill in February of 2009 and it was signed into
law in March of 2009. With the negotiations and then there was another key
change in 2008 that the legislation as made pago-neutral so some of the direct
funding was taken out and the direct funding was limited to what could be
provided by Friant's prepayment of its contract and also the Friant surcharge
payment that was extended and some of the CVPI Restoration Fund monies that were
provide -- paid to it. So there were negotiations that continued as often as is
with legislation all the way up to the time it was enacted. But the core
negotiations in 2006 were finished I believe in October.
>> Thomas Holyoke: You had mentioned that it took a few years to get the
legislation through. Was that just because negotiations were still going on,
because of resistance, or just because it's hard to get time on the agenda?
>> John Watts: It was -- it was for a few reasons but there was resistance in
the House. There were those who did not support it in the House of
Representatives: chiefly Congressman Nunes. And so there were -- and that led to
some of these further changes. There were concerns about was it going to be
sufficiently funded? And then there was this issue that emerged in 2007-2008
about there'd been hope that there would be a funding source to fund it with
direct funding and that turned out to be limited so we had to make it pagoneutral so it wouldn't score over a 10 year period. It wouldn't count as adding
to the deficit over a 10 year period. And we had to address those issues. So
some -- so that was some of it. It also though was -- part of it is a big bill
like this doesn't typically just move that quickly. It has to be folded and
ultimately what happened, it was just folded into a package of many other very
big bills. And on this natural resource bill that it eventually moved into early
2009. So it was partly that too. Things don't move as quickly here as we'd like.

>> Thomas Holyoke: Just so everyone is clear about this. When you say pagoneutral...
>> John Watts: Yes.
>> Thomas Holyoke: ...explain what that means.
>> John Watts: Well pago was a bill that required Congress to pay for things at
the time they're enacted. And you would count how much is the bill spending over
5 and 10 year periods? And is there no additional deficit, no additional
spending beyond whatever revenues are coming in from a bill or is a bill simply
subject to appropriations which would be there within -- would then be scored in
a different way. Here there was direct spending but it was ended up being
limited to the amount that came in from Friant prepaying its contracts, bringing
in some substantial money that way. And then also the Friant surcharge. Friant
paying its surcharge payments. Those types of revenues coming into the treasury.
So basically I guess to try and answer it free of jargon, it's not requiring
anymore spending than is coming into the treasury during a 10 year period.
>> Thomas Holyoke: Okay, so the legislation passes, becomes law and has Senator
Feinstein and yourself monitored the execution implementation?
>> John Watts: Yes, yes.
>> Thomas Holyoke: And tell me your opinions of that.
>> John Watts: Well it's -- I mean it's been moving more slowly than was
originally anticipated for a combination of reasons. I think it's taken longer
to study the environmental impacts of the project. It has taken longer to assess
you know what are the improvements that are going to be needed to levees and
those sorts of things. That's taken longer. We also have had substantial
recession and substantial efforts to reduce federal spending so there's been
less federal funding available during this -- than was originally anticipated.
So its implementation is proceeding, but it's proceeding on a slower schedule.
And the fact the parties have agreed to postpone the introduction of the salmon
by a few years which was originally going to happen in 2014 -- or the full
restoration [inaudible] it was originally going to happen 2014, is now
postponed.
>> Thomas Holyoke: Some have talked about trying to undo the settlement.
>> John Watts: That's true.
>> Thomas Holyoke: Is that even really possible?
>> John Watts: Well is it -- and I think is it possible? I mean you could pass
legislation that as a matter of legal possibility you could pass legislation
that essentially overturned the settlement, yes. Politically I think it's
difficult to undo because the parties all still support it. And the Friant water
districts support it. The federal government still supports it. The
Environmental [inaudible] still support it. And it raises the question of what
would happen if you -- if you did undo it, then you would presumably return it
all to court and on many of the reasons that led to settlement in the first
place would still be in place unless you undid it and then also preempted
various California laws in the process which generally in Congress are very
reluctant to do. But you would -- if you were to avoid having all the

uncertainties of court, you would have to preempt state fishing-gaming code that
requires that when dams are built, that fisheries be maintained in good
condition beneath them unless the California legislature decided to overturn
that. But there's been no significant likelihood of that. So it would raise lots
of questions. That's for sure.
>> Thomas Holyoke: Well they've been putting some more water into the river. The
river's up. Have you had a chance to go out and see it?
>> John Watts: I have not been out there lately. I was out there many times in
2006-2007-2008 but have not been out there lately, no.
>> Thomas Holyoke: One last question. Some people who were involved in
negotiations have talked about the blood oath expiring at some point. Is that
[laughter] -- what was that?
>> John Watts: Well it was -- it is a good term in -- during negotiation 2006,
at the close of the negotiations, when we'd reached agreement, Senator Feinstein
had negotiated many water issues and she's been aware that sometimes down the
road even though when people reach an agreement, they raise concerns about the
agreement they supposedly reached. So she asked as a way of commemorating this
was a serious agreement all the parties present to sign a statement affirming
that they would -- that they agreed to this legislation and the legislation when
making the settlement that they'd come to agreement on it with the changes
included, that they would support it and they would oppose legislative efforts
to block it or undo it. And it was the blood oath because we didn't literally
get I guess a some kind of pin prick and make people sign in blood, but it was a
very serious thing you know making people sign -- or asking people to sign and
getting their agreement that they would sign this commitment to support.
>> Thomas Holyoke: Okay, anything else you want to add here at the end?
>> John Watts: I don't think so. Let me think for a moment. Is there anything
else? Well just I think you know it was a pleasure to work on this and I think I
mean this kind of effort is something that Senator Feinstein likes to do is
solve a problem, try to bring people together in very practical terms, figure
out what they all need you know to solve the problem to both restore our fishery
and maintain the reliable water supply. And it was a pleasure to work on it. And
it's the kind of thing I think that we have to do with California water. There
is you know -- there's no durable solution that's not going to try to do both
those things: maintain a reliable water supply and maintain and restore
fisheries. And so I guess I just want to say it was exciting and a real pleasure
to be part of.
>> Thomas Holyoke: Okay, thank you.
>> John Watts: Great, welcome.

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